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Summary  findings
There  has beenl little  empirical  work  on the  effectiveness  *  The  existence  of explicit  deposit  insurance  lowers
of safety  nets  designed  for banks,  for  lack of data  on  banks'  interest  expenses  and  makes  interest  payments  less
safety  net design  across  couniitries. Demirgiiu-Kunt  and  sensitive  to bank  risk factors,  especially  bank  liquidity.
Huizinga  examine  cross-couniitry data on  bank-level  *  Higher  explicit  coverage,  broader  coverage,  and  the
interest  expense  and deposit  growthi for  evidence  of  existence  of an  earmarked  insurance  fund  increase
market  discipline  in individual  countries.  In addition,  required-deposit  rates  and  reduce  market  discipline.
using  cross-country  informationi  on deposit  insuranice  *  Government  provision  of funds  lowers  deposit  rates
systems,  they  investigate  the  impact  of explicit  deposit  but  also  reduces  market  discipline.
insurance  (and its key features)  on  bank  interest  rates  and  *  Private  (especially  joint)  management  of insurance
market  discipline.  schemes  lowers  deposit  rates  and  improves  market
They  find that:  discipline.
*  Many  countries  retaiin somile  degree  of market
discipline,  regardless  of the  type  of safety net.
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In the last two decades, we have seen a series of banking crises around the world
where banks have become systematically  insolvent. Banking crises have occurred in
developed and developing countries alike. Prominently, the Asian crisis of 1997
involved banking crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea, with banks
becoming insolvent after economic downturns and currency devaluations.
Systemic bank insolvencies involve huge costs to the banks themselves, their
customers and to governments. Bank failures may lead to the destruction of a bank's
information capital garnered in previously nurtured bank-customer relationships. A
disruption of bank lending and of the payments system may also cause a reduction in
investment and other economic activity. Further, bank depositors potentially lose heavily
because of bank failures. Last but not least, governments tend to incur large costs in
remedying a banking crisis. To make financial system breakdowns less likely and to
limit their costs if they occur, all countries of the world have financial safety nets in
place. These nets are amalgams of policies including explicit or implicit deposit
insurance, the central bank's  lending of last resort, bank insolvency resolution
procedures, and bank regulation and supervision.
Bank safety nets are difficult to design and administer, because they have the
conflicting objectives of protecting bank customers and reducing banks' incentives to
engage in risky activities. In several countries including the U.S., the financial safety net,
structured to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system, appears to have had quite
the opposite result. Indeed, Kane (1989) identifies the U.S. financial safety net, and
notably fixed-rate deposit insurance and belated bank closures, as the single most
2important factor in explaining the catastrophic Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s.
Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find international evidence that the
existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme has contributed to banking system
fragility.
To restrain bank risk taking, financial safety nets generally rely on two
mechanisms: (i) market discipline, and (ii) bank regulation. Bank creditors can exert
market discipline by withdrawing their funds, or demanding higher interest rates from
riskier banks. In case of publicly traded banks, equity holders can also effect discipline.
Bank regulations, in turn, can directly restrict a bank's operations, and prescribe
corrective action if bank solvency is jeopardized. The challenge facing policy makers is
to ensure that the financial safety net enables rather than undermines market discipline.
There is a real danger that regulatory forbearance policies and overly generous depositor
protection increase rather than reduce the excessive bank risk taking which has been the
root cause of many bank failures.
A substantial literature discusses the potential effects of safety net design and
implementation on market discipline. This literature proposes various design features
such as limited insurance coverage.,  co-insurance, and private deposit insurance that leave
some room for market discipline in an explicit (public) scheme of deposit insurance. See
Kane (1999) for a general discussion, and Ely (1986), Calomiris (1997) and Wall (1998)
for specific proposals concerning private deposit insurance and (uninsured) subordinated
bank debt. For lack of empirical evidence, this debate about deposit insurance design has
been entirely theoretical and hypothetical. Hence, we do not know whether deposit
3insurance design features that work well in theory work equally well in practice. The
main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in our knowledge.
First, we investigate empirically to what extent market discipline exists around the
world. There is a considerable body of literature on market discipline mostly for the U.S.
that generally finds support for the existence of some market discipline by bank creditors.
We contribute to this literature by extending the analysis to a large number of developed
and developing countries. To do this, we investigate the sensitivity of (i) bank deposit
interest rates, and (ii) deposit growth rates to indicators of bank risk. Specifically, we
relate a bank's implicit cost of funds (measured as interest expenses divided by interest-
paying debt) to bank risk measures such as the capitalization ratio, profitability and
liquidity. This is done separately for 38 countries over the years 1990-1997. In addition,
for a larger set of 52 countries we examine whether market discipline entails that riskier
banks are less able to attract deposits. To this aim, we relate the measured growth rate of
(real) deposits to bank risk measures.
Secondly and more importantly, we examine whether differences in market
discipline across countries can be explained by different design features of financial
safety nets. Evidence of this kind should be useful to policy makers around the world, as
they grapple with the question of how to design a financial safety net without
undermining market discipline. To enable this work, we have collected detailed
information on the nature of deposit insurance for over 50 countries. This data shows that
there is considerable cross-country variation in key design features such as insurance
coverage, co-insurance, source of funding and fund management. On a cross-country
basis, we relate the extent of market discipline (in terms of bank deposit interest rates and
4deposit growth) to whether there exists an explicit deposit insurance scheme, and, if so,
how it is constituted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
deposit insurance information, and other data used in this study. Section 3 presents the
empirical evidence on market discipline regarding deposit interest rates and deposit
growth in individual countries. Section 4 examines how the existence of an explicit
deposit insurance scheme affects market discipline, and particularly how it affects the
relationship between bank interest expenses and bank risk factors. Section 5 examines
how specific deposit insurance design features are valued by depositors, as reflected in
required deposit interest rates, and how they affect market discipline. Section 6
concludes.
II.  The data
This study combines cross-country institutional data on deposit insurance design
and bank-level data on interest expenses, deposit growth and other derived variables.
Information on deposit insurance schemes in individual countries as of 1997 is
represented in Table 1. As reported in the table, we have put together this information
from a variety of sources. As also seen in the table, many countries have moved to
explicit deposit insurance schemes during the 1980s  and 1990s, although there remain
ample countries that do not have explicit deposit insurance. In the absence of explicit
deposit insurance, there is implicit deposit insurance by national governments. 2
2  In the U.S., for instance,  deposit  insurance  has frequently  been  extended  to uninsured  credits,  but less  so
since the passage of the of  FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (see Benston and Kaufman, 1998).
5As mentioned, a major cost of introducing explicit deposit insurance is that it
potentially undercuts market discipline. In principle, this effect could be dampened by the
adoption of features that enhance market discipline. The common element of such
features is to ensure that there will be a credible first layer of private loss in case of bank
failure. Such losses provide private parties with incentives to continue to monitor banks
and to remain vigilant.
One market discipline-inducing feature is co-insurance. Co-insurance here means
that depositors are contractually required to share in their bank's losses (up to a
maximum percentage of deposits) regardless of deposit size. Relatively few countries,
Chile, Colombia, Poland and the United Kingdom among them, have co-insurance.
Another way to induce some depositor vigilance is to ensure that insurance
coverage is truly finite. Indeed, most countries in our sample specify an upper limit to
officially protected deposits, with the exceptions of Mexico and Japan where de jure
covered amounts are unlimited. One way to limit insurance coverage is to exclude
interbank and foreign currency deposits. This is common in most countries (see table).
An important way to engage private parties in the deposit insurance scheme is to
make them underwrite and manage some or all of the insurance. Table 1 reveals that there
is extensive variation across countries in terms of the source of funding of deposit
schemes, and in terms of fund management. Most explicit deposit insurance schemes
establish insurance funds, and most of the payments into the fund come from banks, or
jointly from banks and the government. There is also wide dispersion in the deposit
insurance premium that banks have to pay into the fund. Making deposit insurance
premiums risk-based is a sensible way to try to reduce bank risk taking. Yet, so far in the
6sample only Finland, Peru, Sweden and the U.S. have adopted risk-based insurance
premiums. At least with hindsight, there appears to be no relationship between the
deposit insurance premium and actual bank risk. For instance, the premiums in Norway
and Japan are 0.0 15 and 0.084 percent of deposits per annum, while both countries have
dealt with severe banking crises. Even in the U.S. where risk rates range from 0 to 27
basis points, more than 90 percent of the banks qualify for the lowest assessment rate
which is zero.
Finally, regarding fund membership, it is noteworthy that many developed
countries do not have compulsory bank membership of the insurance fund.
Our bank-level data are derived from bank balance sheets and income statements,
as available from the BankScope data base compiled by Fitch IBCA. The data set covers
all OECD countries, as well as many developing countries. For a list of countries
included in our work, see Table 2. Bank coverage is comprehensive for most countries,
with covered banks roughly accounting for 90 percent of all bank assets nationwide. The
sample covers the period 1990-1997,  and includes about 2500 individual banks.
Table 2 also provides mean values for all bank-level variables used in the
empirical work. Interest Expense is the annual interest expense divided by bank debt,
excluding non-interest bearing debt if any. Interest Expense is thus an implicit interest
rate on all de jure insured and uninsured bank liabilities. In most countries, bank
liabilities that are not covered by explicit deposit insurance may enjoy de facto, implicit
insurance. Hence, the dividing line between covered and uncovered liabilities is difficult
to draw in practice.
7Deposit Growth is the growth rate of a bank's customer and short term funding,
after dividing by the GDP deflator. On average, banks in Costa Rica, Nigeria, and the
United Kingdom were contracting during the sample period, while Ghana and Peru had
rather high annual real deposit growth rate of around 30 percent. Equity is book value of
equity divided by bank assets. There is considerable variation in Equity across countries.
While this may reflect different capital adequacies, it equally may reflect internationally
differing definitions of book capital. Profit is defined as net-of-tax profits divided by
assets, and Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to assets. Higher values of the Equity,
Profit and Liquidity variables presumably indicate lower bank riskiness for depositors.
Admittedly, these indicators are not the best indicators of bank riskiness.  Especially
Equity and Profit are subject to accounting manipulation and tend to be overstated at
weak banks. Nevertheless, these are the bank level variables available to us for a large
cross-section of countries.
Overhead is defined as non-interest bank expenses divided by assets, reflecting
bank variation in employment as well as wage levels. Differences in overhead may
equally capture differences in banks' product mixes and the quality of service. Despite
high wage levels, Overhead is lowest at around 1 percent for high-income countries, such
as Japan and Luxembourg. It is notably high at 3.6 percent for the United States, perhaps
reflecting the proliferation of banks and bank branches due to historical banking
restrictions.
Finally, Short-Term Debt/Total Debt is a bank's customer and short term funding
divided by total interest-bearing debt. This variable is a determinant of Interest Expense,
if customer deposits receive different interest rates from, say, marketable notes and
8debentures. For most countries, Short-Term Debt/Total Debt is close to unity, reflecting
the importance of short term debt in total debt.
Prior to the analysis outliers, some of them obvious data errors, are removed.
Furthermore, we removed observations with negative equity and profits less than -3
percent, since we wanted to concentrate on solvent institutions. Insolvent institutions that
continue to operate may be propped up by cheap credit from their respective central
banks, which in turn may give the misleading impression that riskier banks have lower
interest expenses. On account of insufficient data, regressions for some individual
countries could not be estimated. Data for these countries were also excluded from the
cross-country regressions.  Below, however, we report some sensitivity tests of how these
steps in constructing the cross-country sample affect the results.
III.  International evidence on market discipline
A.  Do riskier banks pay higher interest rates?
In this section, we present empirical evidence on whether there is market
discipline on banks for a range of individual countries. In principle, depositors can
discipline banks that engage in excessive risk-taking, by demanding higher interest rates
or by withdrawing their deposits. We start with the first issue. Several researchers have
investigated whether the cost of debt finance for banks reflects their apparent default risk
for the case of the United States (see Flannery (1998) for a recent survey). Researchers
(Baer and Brewer 1986, Hannan and Hanweck 1988, and Brewer and Mondschean 1994)
typically find that rates on large, partially uninsured CDs reflect bank riskiness. For the
1983-1991 period, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) similarly find that spreads on uninsured
9bank debentures (relative to a constructed callable treasury bond) significantly reflect
bank risk in the years 1989-1891, a period when doubts arose whether federal regulators
would fully bail out debt holders of bank holding companies. Using similar data only for
1983-1984, Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990) had
failed to find any such evidence. Relating time series of CD rates to bank-specific news
as reflected in stock prices, Ellis and Flannery (1992) similarly find evidence that bank
CD rates indeed reflect bank-specific risk. Finally, Cook and Spellman (1994) find that
risk premiums on fully insured deposits at Savings and Loans equally reflect bank risk
factors in 1987, since the FSLIC guarantor of these deposits was technically insolvent at
that time, causing doubts about the quality of its guarantees.
In summary, the U.S. experience shows that there is evidence of market discipline
on banks by insured and uninsured debt holders alike. Specifically, insured deposit rates
may reflect bank risk factors, if doubts arise about the credibility of the insurance
coverage. The U.S. experience thus shows that the distinction between explicit and
implicit deposit insurance becomes blurred, if there is a perceived risk of repudiation of
deposit insurance obligations.
This subsection extends the evidence on market discipline through liability
interest rates to a total of 38 countries. Specifically, for each country we estimate the
following equation:
Interest  Expense;,t  =  ca  + X i't-1P +  si,t  (1)
10where Interest Expensei,t  is the ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing debt for bank i,
X i,t-l  is a vector of lagged bank variables, and 6j,t  is a stochastic term. The vector X ij-1
includes Equity, Liquidity, and Profit as indices of bank risk. In addition, Overhead and
Short Term Debt/Total Debt are included as controls. As higher values of the risk factors
represent less risk, we expect these variables to enter the interest expense regressions
negatively if there is market discipline. Overhead would enter the regression negatively if
banks with high overhead offer high quality services, and therefore can attract deposits at
lower rates. Alternatively, Overhead may simply reflect bank inefficiency, and cause
depositors to demand higher rates to compensate for this inefficiency. The Short Term
Debt! Total Debt ratio can also have either sign, depending in part on the yield curve.
Throughout, we take log transformations of all variables, and the right-hand-side bank
variables are lagged one period.
For each country, we first estimate (1) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Second, we estimate the equation using the means of all the bank variables. This provides
us with between estimates indicating how the dependent variable changes, if we compare
the independent variables across different banks. Third, we estimate the equation
controlling for bank means (using the deviation from bank means for each variable). This
provides us with within estimates telling us how the dependent variable changes with the
independent variables, as these independent variables change for the same bank over
time.
The OLS, between, and within estimates of (1) for each country separately are
presented in Table 3. In each case, we only report the coefficients on the three risk
factors, i.e. Equity, Profit, and Liquidity. Coefficients that are significant at 5 percent or
11less based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent  errors are bold-faced. The
coefficients on the three risk factors are predominantly negative, which we take as
evidence of market discipline. As a broad-brush index of market discipline, we can
simply sum the three interest elasticities for a particular specification, with a negative
sum suggesting market discipline. By this index, the OLS estimates imply that  30 out of
38 countries are more likely than not to have market discipline; for the between estimates,
the number is  26 out of 34 countries; and for the within index the number is 24 out of 36
countries. Taking significant negative coefficients on risk factors to be evidence of
market discipline, we see that many countries have some market discipline, among them
the United Kingdom and the United States. In the sample, Norway, Nigeria, Pakistan are
among the countries that have suffered banking crises where depositors have been made
whole. Not surprisingly, these countries are among the countries where we fail to find
evidence of market discipline. An absence of market discipline can, of course, exist for
various reasons. Depositors may simply fail to monitor banks closely; alternatively, bank
regulators are relied upon to close insolvent banks promptly before depositor losses
occur; or, as indicated, the safety net may be so complete as to eliminate all risk for
depositors. Regressions for individual countries do not allow us to infer the underlying
causes of any absence or presence of market discipline.
B.  Do riskier banks attract fewer deposits?
This section considers whether deposit growth of banks varies with their apparent
default risk. A small literature has considered this issue for the U.S. and elsewhere. Kane
(1987), for instance, finds that depositors withdrew funds only from those Ohio
12institutions that were covered by the Ohio insurance fund when the latter was in crisis.
Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani (1998) similarly find that riskier U.S. thrifts
experienced smaller deposit growth during the 1980s. More specifically, these authors
find that deposit growth is negatively related to the estimated probability of thrift default.
Considering banks in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, Martinez Peria and Schmukler
(1998) find that deposits are negatively related to lagged bank risk factors derived from
accounting data.
In this section, we provide evidence on the relationship between deposit growth
and bank risk factors for 52 countries. We estimate an equation analogous to (1), where
the dependent variable is Deposit Growth, now defined as the log difference of this
period's real deposits and last period's real deposits. Real deposits are calculated as
nominal deposits deflated by the GDP deflator. The explanatory variables again include
the log transfonnations of the lagged bank risk factors (Equity, Profits, and Liquidity).
Positive coefficients on these risk factors indicate market discipline, as then deposit
growth is relatively higher at safer banks. As controls, we include Overhead and Size,
defined as deflated total assets. Again, banks with high Overhead may grow relatively
slowly or quickly, while the Size variable introduces a possible scale effect on deposit
growth. Scale effects may be important if a policy of too-large-to-fail stimulates the
growth of deposits at large banks regardless of their measured risk factors.
As before, we obtain OLS, between, and within estimates for the deposit growth
equation for each country. The results are given in Table 4.
As seen in Table 4, the fit of the deposit growth regressions, as proxied by
adjusted R-squares, is quite poor. The low explanatory power and generally inconclusive
13results may reflect that actual deposit growth rates result from several opposing forces.
On the one hand, insolvent or near-insolvent banks may wish to pursue a risky growth
strategy on the off-chance of overcoming their difficulties. Riskier banks may succeed in
attracting additional deposits if they pay interest rates that are high enough. Such a
growth strategy would maximally exploit the bank safety net. 3 Alternatively, risky banks
may decide or be forced by regulators to scale down by selling off assets and reducing
deposit taking. Retrenchment may be the preferred strategy, if bank charter values are
considerable. The choice between growth and retrenchment strategies may firther be
affected by agency problems between management and shareholders. Specifically, bank
managers have to reckon that a bankruptcy may wipe out a considerable share of their
human capital. 4
On balance, it is not clear whether one should expect riskier banks to have
relatively high deposit growth. Therefore, the revealed low explanatory power of deposit
growth regressions is not surprising. Thus, we conclude that markets force riskier banks
to pay higher interest rates, even if it is not clear whether riskier banks are forced by the
market to retrench.
IV.  Market discipline and deposit insurance
One of the important factors that potentially affects market discipline is the
financial safety net. The safety net is the whole of financial regulations and institutions
3Of  course,  portfolio  choice  in addition  to growth  may  affect  bank  risk.
4  Several  authors  have examined  how agency  problems  may affect  bank risk  taking.  Saunders,  Strock  and
Travlos  (1990)  find  that 'stock-holder  controlled'  banking  firms  tend  to take on more  risk  than
'managerially  controlled'  firms.  Gorton  and  Rosen  (1995)  instead  argue  that  entrenched  managers,  who
own  considerable  stock  in a bank,  may  take on more  risk.
14that seeks to prevent or limit depositor losses in case of an (impending) bank failure. By
this definition, the safety net includes explicit and implicit deposit insurance, bank
insolvency resolution practices, regulatory forbearance policies, and the central bank's
functioning as a lender of last resort. Thus. variation in the extent of market discipline
across countries should in part reflect international differences in the operation of the
financial safety net. In this section, we present the results of tests of the impact of explicit
deposit insurance, as part of the safety net, on market discipline via deposit rates and
deposit growth. To do this, it is necessary to combine cross-country bank level data and
institutional data that reflect differences in the financial safety net. To our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to systematically  examine the impact of the safety net on market
discipline.
Focusing first on the cost of bank liabilities, we estimate the following equation:
Interest Expense ijj.t =  + Xjj,t  ,  +  Yjj y + 6 D j,t +  D j  X ij7t-I  +  gij,t  (2)
where  XJ,j- is a vector of variables for bank i in country j lagged  one period, X i,j,t-I  '  is
the subset of this vector comprising the three risk factors (Equity, Profits, and Liquidity),
Yj,t  is a vector of macroeconomic controls for country j,  t is a dummy variable flagging
the existence of an explicit deposit insurance regime and, finally, cij,t  is a stochastic term.
The macroeconomic controls are Inflation (calculated as the log difference of this
period's GDP deflator and last period's GDP deflator), Growth ( the log difference of this
period real GDP and last period's real GDP), the Government Rate (the log of the Tbill
rate where available; otherwise the discount rate), and Gnp/cap (the log of real GNP per
15capita). In some specifications, we also include interaction terms of the deposit insurance
dummy, D j,t  with the bank risk factors X ij,t-l'.
As before, negative estimates of ,3  are interpreted as evidence of market
discipline. A negative (positive) estimate of 8 would indicate that the existence of an
explicit deposit insurance scheme reduces (increases) bank interest expenses. A reduction
of required deposit rates on account of deposit insurance suggests that on balance
depositors value deposit insurance (taking into account any induced effects on bank risk
taking and the likelihood of bank failure). The interaction terms of the deposit insurance
variable with bank risk factors enable us to estimate whether an explicit deposit insurance
system reduces or enhances market discipline. Specifically, positive estimates of the '
coefficients suggest that explicit deposit insurance reduces market discipline, since the
absolute value of P + 4  becomes smaller (for a negative estimate of ,B),  indicating a
reduced sensitivity of liability interest rates to bank risk factors.
Versions of equation (2) are estimated by OLS, and for mean values of all
variables by he between estimator.5 In both cases, we weigh the observations by the
inverse of the number of banks in the country. To be precise, in the OLS regressions the
weight is the inverse of the number of banks in a given year, while in the between
estimation it is the inverse of the overall number of banks in a country.
We estimate three different specifications. First, we estimate (2) without including
the deposit insurance dummy or any of its interaction terms. The results are given in
columns l.a and 1  .b of Table 5 for the between and OLS estimates, respectively. Equity
5  We do not report within  estirnates  as there  is no variation  in the deposit  insurance  dummy  over  time for
the countries  in our sample  except  for Greece  and  Peru.
16enters negatively in both columns, but is only significant inmb.  Profit also enters
negatively in both columns, although it is only significant in a. Strongest support for
market discipline comes from the Liquidity variable, which is negative and highly
significant in both columns. Overall, these results confirm our country-level results
supportive of the existence of market discipline. Turning to our control variables, the
negative coefficient on Overhead suggests a trade-off between interest and non-interest
expenses. The positive coefficient on the Short Term Debt/Total Debt variable, in turn,
suggests that on average short term bank debt is more expensive. Among the macro
variables, we see that the Government Rate enters positively, while Inflation is not
significant. The coefficients on Growth and Gnp/cap are negative and positive,
respectively, where significant. The negative coefficients on Growth may reflect that
banks in high-growth countries have lower default probabilities, and hence need to pay
their deposit holders lower interest rates. The positive coefficient on Gnp/capita may
further be due to ceilings on deposit rates that keep these rates lower in developing
countries.
Second, we add the deposit insurance dummy to the regression. The results are
reported in columns 2.a and 2.b, with significant negative coefficients. 6 This suggests that
an explicit deposit insurance scheme causes depositors to perceive their deposits to be
safer, leading to lower implicit bank interest rates. To estimate the size of the deposit
insurance effect on deposit rates, we calculate the predicted values of the implicit interest
expense evaluated at mean values for all bank and macro variables for the two cases of
6  Included banks are from 28 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nigeria, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
17explicit deposit insurance (theinsurance dummy equals one) and implicit deposit
insurance (the insurance dummy equals zero). After taking antilogs, we find that explicit
deposit insurance reduces the average deposit rate by 46 and 67 basis points on the basis
of specifications 2b and 2a, respectively. 7
In the final two columns of Table 5, we present the results of regressions where we
also include the three risk variables interacted with the deposit insurance dummy. For the
between estimates of column 3.a, the only risk variable that is significant is Liquidity. The
sign of Liquidity itself is negative, as expected. The coefficient of the interacted Liquidity
variable also is significant, but instead positive. In the presence of explicit deposit
insurance, interest sensitivity to bank liquidity is thus significantly lower. This suggests
that explicit deposit insurance reduces market discipline. An F-test of the hypothesis of ,B
+ + = 0 is rejected, indicating that deposit insurance reduces, but not fully eliminates
market discipline through deposit rates. In column 3.b, the only risk variable that is
significant is again Liquidity, with the expected negative sign. Among the interacted risk
variables, Liquidity is again significant and positive, strengthening the evidence that
deposit insurance reduces market discipline. However, in this specification the interaction
term with Equity is also significant and negative, weakening the evidence. 8 Finally,
7  Our result is consistent  with  the fmding  of Bartholdy,  Boyle  and Stover  (undated)  that explicit  deposit
insurance  reduces  the deposit  rate by 25 basis  points.  These  authors,  however,  consider  a rather  small
sample of 13 OECD countries. Another difference is that these authors use a representative CD rate for a
particular country so that no bank-specific (risk) factors are included.
s  Note that book equity is subject to accounting manipulation and is generally a less reliable indicator of a
bank's stability than a measure of liquid assets.
18note that the interaction terms do not materially affect the significance levels of the
various bank and macro controls in columns 3.a and 3.b. 9
On the basis of the international evidence, we conclude that explicit deposit
insurance reduces bank liability rates for the banking sector.'  0 Also, we find evidence that
deposit insurance makes individual bank interest rates less sensitive to bank risk factors,
especially liquidity, thereby reducing market discipline on banks.
Analogously to (2), one can also estimate the impact of deposit insurance on the
growth rate of deposits. Table 6 reports these results. In the regressions, the only risk
variable that is significant is Equity, with the expected positive sign. Thus, we find some
evidence that well-capitalized banks attract more deposits, as expected with market
discipline. As for the earlier individual country regressions, however, adjusted R-squares
are very low as evidence of a rather poor fit of the model. The explicit insurance dummy
9 Several  sensitivity  tests  were performed  to check  the robustness  of the results  in Table  5. In parallel,  we
re-entered  various  sets  of observations  that  were  previously  eliminated.  First,  we returned  observations
eliminated  because  there  were  too few  observations  from  a particular  country.  This  produces  6 additional
countries  (to a total  of 34 countries)  iP the deposit  insurance-inclusive  regressions  in Table  5 (but  only 50
more observations  in  the 2 OLS specifications).  Also,  we put back  observations  with  bank-variable
outliers  (such  as institutions  with  negative  equity,  or profits  less  than  -3 percent  of assets,  or interest
expenses  exceeding  50 percent  of assets).  This  produced  407 additional  observations  in the 2 deposit
insurance-inclusive  OLS  regressions.  Next,  we restored  observations  excluded  because  of obvious  bank-
variable  errors  (banks  with  impossibly  negative  balance  sheet  items),  producing  12  additional
observations  in the 2 OLS  specifications.  Finally,  we lifted  the restrictions  that the underlying  inflation
rate  and the government  interest  rate  not exceed  100  percent.  None  of these  4 sensitivity  checks  produces
a deposit  variable  or an interaction  variable  that is significant  in  any of the regressions  of Table  5 where
it was not, and  vice versa.  Putting  back  the high-inflation  observations  does  yield  the result  that Interest
Expense  is positively  related  to the Government  Rate, but  negatively  to Inflation.
° To see whether  deposit  insurance  on  net makes  funding  cheaper  to banks,  one also  has to take into
account  the insurance  premiums  that  banks  have  to pay. From  Table 1, we see that  most countries  charge
deposit  premiums  that are less  than the range  of 46-67  basis  points.  Hence,  deposit  insurance  on net
appears  to provide  a subsidy.  According  to Buser,  Chen  and  Kane  (1981),  it is this subsidy  that  entices
banks  to accept  the regulations  that  often  come  with  deposit  insurance.  An important  objective  of deposit
insurance,  however,  is to prevent  destractive  bank  runs.  If successful  in this  regard,  deposit  insurance  can
lower  deposit  rates  to the benefit  of the banks  even  if there is no implicit  subsidy  forthcoming.
19enters the various specifications only with insignificant coefficients." Thus, we find no
evidence that deposit insurance on average causes higher or lower deposit growth.
Deposit growth equations with interaction terms of the deposit insurance variable with
bank risk factors have equally low explanatory power and are not reported.
V.  How do differences in deposit insurance design affect bank funding costs and
market discipline?
An increasing number of countries has adopted explicit deposit insurance systems
in response to bank system fragility around the world. As a case in point, the European
Union requires member states to have an explicit deposit insurance system in place since
1994.12  In its policy advice, the IMF has also advocated the adoption of explicit deposit
insurance systems.'3 Notwithstanding the current movement to explicit schemes, the U.S.
experience has shown that a badly designed and administered deposit insurance scheme
can exacerbate bank moral hazard to increase risk (see Kane, 1989). Hence, the details of
deposit insurance design may be very important in shaping banks' incentives to take on
undue risk.
So far in the paper, we have shown that the existence of explicit deposit insurance
(i) reduces the interest rates required by depositors, and (ii) also reduces market
discipline. In this section, we investigate whether several specific deposit insurance
l  Included banks are from 46 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Canada, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Honduras,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, Nepal,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Taiwan,
Thailand,  South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Zambia.
12  See Lars Fredborg (1995).
13  For details, see Garcia (1999).
20design features (as presented in Table 1) affect bank deposit rates and market discipline.
In particular, we estimate a set of cross-country regression of the following
Interest Exp. ij,t =  a + Xij,t.I  t + Yj,e  y + 8 D j,t +  +D  j,t F j,t  + D j,t F j,t X iu,t-'  0 +  cij,t  (3)
where Fj,t  is the value of a particular design feature, and other variables are as defined
before. Typically, a design feature is a categorical variable that indicates whether or not a
system has a particular design feature. For instance, the co-insurance design feature is a
dummy variable that indicates whether an explicit insurance system features co-insurance
by depositors. Only two design features (the coverage limit and the deposit insurance
premium) are scale variables. As before, in some specifications we also include
interaction terms of a particular deposit insurance design feature with the bank risk
factors. Again, positive estimates of the 0 coefficients suggest that the design feature
reduces market discipline.
The regression results regarding the impact of different design features on implicit
interest rates are reported in Table 7. For those design features that are significant, we
also investigate their impact on market discipline by introducing interaction terms with
risk factors. The results of these regressions including interaction terms are reported in
Table 8. As with the deposit insurance dummy, design features hardly vary over time.
Therefore, we only estimate the pooled-OLS specification and the between specification
based on mean values. In Table 7, we report OLS and between estimates of the
coefficients I, 8 and 4,  and in Table 8 we do the same for  3,  8, + and 0.
21In the first column of Table 7, we include a dummy variable for the existence of
co-insurance. Since this is a design feature that introduces additional depositor risk, we
expect Co-insurance to enter the regressions with a positive sign. The estimated
coefficients are indeed positive but insignificant, perhaps because only two counties in
the sample (Ireland and the United Kingdom) have co-insurance.
The next column in Table 7 investigates the impact of the explicit coverage limit
on interest rates. The coverage limit is calculated as the statutory coverage limit (as in
Table 1) divided by GDP per capita. Ceteris paribus, one expects a higher coverage limit
to lower required deposit rates, as higher coverage should enhance depositor safety. The
general equilibrium effect may be opposite, however, if enhanced coverage exacerbates
bank moral hazard and thus increases the probability of bank failure. The probability of
bankruptcy remains important to depositors despite deposit insurance, if not all of their
deposits are covered, if the announced deposit insurance is not fully credible, or if bank
failure involves resource costs to depositors not covered by the insurance scheme. In both
the OLS and between specifications, the coverage limit variable enters with a positive
sign, although it is only significant at the 10 percent level in the OLS specification.
Paradoxically, these results suggest that a (marginal) increase in the announced coverage
limit on average is not valued by depositors.
The next two columns in Table 7 refer to the insurance coverage of foreign
currency deposits and interbank deposits in explicit systems, respectively. The positive
and significant coefficient in the foreign coverage equation for the OLS specification
again suggests that expanded coverage tends to increase interest rates, or at least that it
22offsets the decrease in interest rates that explicit insurance without the expanded coverage
would bring.
The next set of columns include dummy variables relating to the ex ante funding
of the scheme, and what sources the funding comes from. The funding variable takes on a
value of 0 if the scheme is implicit or unfunded and uncallable, a value of 1 if the fund is
unfunded but callable, and a value of 2 if the scheme is funded. The OLS estimation of
the regression with this Funding variable yields a positive and significant sign. A funded
scheme thus is estimated to significantly reduce the amount by which an explicit scheme
would lower deposit rates. A fumded  scheme may lead to a smaller reduction in implicit
interest rates compared to an unfunded scheme, because the presence of funds earmarked
for insolvency resolution may introduce strong incentives for banks to up their risk so as
to increase the likelihood of being able to 'raid' the insurance fund.
The next variable represents the source of the funding. This sourcing variable
takes on a value 0 if the insurance system is implicit, a value of 1 if funds come from
banks only, a value of 2 if funds come from the government and banks, and a value of 3
if funds come from the government only. The estimated coefficient on the source-of-
funds variable is negative and significant for both OLS and between specifications. Thus,
the more heavily the government is involved in the funding, the lower are required
deposit rates. This may reflect that government funding is deemed more credible than
bank funding.
Next, we analyze whether the premium level (as a percentage of deposits) paid by
the banks affect the implicit rates. If anything, we expect a higher premium to lead to
lower implicit rates, as the insurance premiums should to some extent be passed on to a
23bank's deposit customers. However, we find no evidence of premium pass-through to a
bank's deposit customers.
The next two variables relate to the fund's management. The first variable takes
on a value of 0 if the scheme is implicit, a value of 1 if the management is public, a value
of 2 if the management is jointly public and private, and a value of  3 if management is
entirely private. This management index enters with negative and significant coefficients
in both OLS and between specifications. This suggests that private management is more
effective in keeping in check the moral hazards associated with deposit insurance. In an
additional regression, individual dumnmy  variables for joint and private management
similarly suggest that private management of insurance funds leads to a greater reduction
in interest rates.
Finally, we have a membership dummy variable, that equals 1 if bank
membership in the insurance scheme is compulsory and zero otherwise. Ex ante, we may
think that voluntary bank membership in the scheme leads to compounded problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard, leading to higher deposits rates. However, the
membership variable turns out to be insignificant in either regression specification.
To see the impact of the design features on market discipline, we next consider
Table 8. Positive interaction terms of a deposit insurance feature with bank risk factors
suggest that the particular feature weakens market discipline. Looking at the OLS
estimates, we find evidence that a higher explicit coverage and funding only from
government sources reduce market discipline, while  joint or private management of funds
improves market discipline. The results concerning the insurance coverage of foreign
currency deposits or the existence of ex ante funding are less clear, since in these
24instances the interactions of the feature with the Equity variable are also significant, and
with a negative sign. Turning to the between estimates, we find that the interaction terms
with Liquidity are positive and significant for the reported design features (except for the
coverage limit and joint management of funds), indicating a reduction in market
discipline.
VI.  Conclusions
Policy makers around the world design and operate financial safety nets so as to
prevent costly bank insolvencies. However, designing and implementing an effective
safety net is a difficult task, since overgenerous protection of banks may easily introduce
risk-enhancing moral hazard, and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The
challenge facing policy makers is to provide depositor protection without unduly
undermining market discipline. The design of the safety net is therefore crucial in
providing the right mix of market and regulatory discipline of banks. A considerable
amount of theoretical and prescriptive literature exists on this issue. At this point,
empirical work is desperately needed to better inform policy recommendations. Empirical
work of this kind has been lacking because of an absence of available information on
safety net design across countries.
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, for a large
number of developed and developing countries we analyze bank-level interest expense
and deposit growth data to investigate if there is any evidence of market discipline in
individual countries. Second, using cross-country information on deposit insurance
25systems we investigate the impact of explicit deposit insurance and its key features on
bank interest rates and market discipline.
Our country-level results show that many countries around the world retain some
degree of market discipline, regardless of the different safety nets they may have. This
may be due to incomplete coverage or lack of credibility of existing schemes, or reflect
inherent costs involved in recovering funds even if schemes are fully credible.
To investigate the linkages between market discipline and deposit insurance, we
estimate regressions with cross-country data. Here our results show that the existence of
an explicit insurance lowers banks' interest expenses and makes interest payments less
sensitive to bank risk factors, particularly to bank liquidity. Thus explicit deposit
insurance is found to reduce market discipline on banks by their creditors.
We also investigate whether specific deposit insurance design features matter,
since the various countries with explicit deposit insurance operate systems with vastly
different coverage, funding, and management. Here our results suggest that higher
explicit coverage, broader coverage, and the existence of earmarked insurance funds
increase required deposit rates, while a government provision of funds and private
management of deposit insurance lower deposit rates.
We also examine the impact of these features on market discipline. We find that
higher coverage and government-funding only reduce market discipline, while private
and especially joint management of insurance schemes may improve market discipline.
There is also some evidence that the existence of an earmarked fund and broader
insurance coverage reduce market discipline, but these results are less clear.
26This research has importanit  policy implications. Deposit insurance is found to be
valued by bank creditors, since it leads to lower required interest rates. The increase in
perceived safety for depositors, however, comes at a cost of a reduction in market
discipline. Thus at a broad level, the adoption of an explicit deposit scheme involves the
trade-off between increased depositor safety and reduced market discipline on banks.
To probe deeper, it is necessary to evaluate the desirability of key deposit
insurance design features. Our evidence on this count suggests that higher explicit
coverage limits on average are undesirable, as they increase interest rates and reduce
market discipline. If anything, this suggests that currently coverage limits tend to be too
high. Private or joint management of funds equally lead to lower rates and improved
market discipline alike, and are therefore deemed desirable. Government-only funding of
the deposit insurance scheme is found to lower required deposit rates, but at a cost of
lower market discipline. Thus, this feature again presents policy makers with an
important trade-off between depositor safety and bank risk taking. Finally, broader
coverage of deposit insurance and the existence of an earmarked fund also are found to
increase deposit rates, while there is evidence -although weaker- that these features
reduce market discipline. Hence, these features may be undesirable.
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30Table I.  Deposit Insurance System Features
Implicit  denotes  lack of an explicit  scheme. Date established  refers  to data of statute  enactment.  Co-insurance  is a dummy  variable that takes  on a value of one if depositors  face a
deductible  in their insured  funds.  Coverage  limit refers  to the amount  the authorities  insure  explicitly.  Foreign  currency  deposits  and Interbank  deposits  take a value of one if insurance
coverage  extends  to those areas.  Funding  takes  a value  of one if the scheme  is funded  ex-ante.  Source  of funding  can be from government  only (2), banks  and government  (1), or banks
only  (0). The  premium  banks  pay is given  as a percentage  of deposits  or liabilities.  Management  of the fund can be official  (1), officiaVprivate  joint (2), or private  (3). Membership  of the
fund can be compulsory  or voluntary.  Sources: "Deposit  protection  arrangement:  a survey",  Alexander  Kyei, IMF WP/90/134,  Washington,  D.C.; "Global Surveys",  Institute  of
International  Bankers,  1998,  1997,  1996,  1995,  1994;  "Korea  introduces  bank deposit  insurance  scheme",  Dong Won Ko, Intemational  Financial  Law Review,  April 1997;  "Banking
failures  in developing  countries:  an auditor's  perspective",  Javed  Nizam,  International  Journal  of Government  Auditing,  January 1998;  "Belgium  implements  deposit  guarantee-scheme",
Andre  Bruyneel,  and  Axel  Miller,  International  Financial  Law  Review,  June 1995;  "Incentive  structure  and resolution  of financial  institution  distress:  Latin  American  experience",  Thomas
Glaessner,  and Ignacio  Mas, Latin  America  and the Caribbean  Regional  Office,  World  Bank,  November  1991;  "Reform  of the Finnish  deposit  guarantee  scheme",  Veli-Pekka  Valori  and
Jukka Vesala,  Bank of Finland  Bulletin,  March 1998;  "Japan:  Stimulation  package",  anon., Oxford  Analytica  Brief, December  1997;  "EC deposit-guarantee  directive",  Lars  Fredborg,
International  Financial  Law  Review,  December  1995.
Countries  Type:  Date  Co-  Coverage  Foreign  Interbank  Funding:  Source  of Funding:  Insurance  Premium Management: Membership:
Established  insurance  Limit  Currency  Deposits  of Deposits  or
Implicit  (0),  Deposits  Covered  Unfunded  (0),  Banks  only  (0),  Liabilities  Public  (1),  Voluntary  (0),
Explicit  (1)  (National  Covered  Funded  (1)  Gov.  and Banks  (1),  Joint (2),  Compulsory  (1)
Currency  or  Gov.  only  (2)  Private  (3)
ECU)
Argentina  1  1979  &  0  20,000  US $  I  n.a  I  1  .0018-.0072  of  2  1
1995  average  deposits
Australia  0
Austria  1  1979  0  260,000  ATS  0  0  0  0  callable  3  1
Bahrain  1  1993  n.a  I  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Belgium  1  1985  0  15,000  ECU  0  0  1  0  .0002  of deposits  2  1
from  clients
Benin  0
Bolivia  1  1991  0  4,200  SDR  n.a.  n.a.  0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Botswana  0
Canada  1  1967  0  60,000  Can.  $  0  0  1  1  0.0016  of insured  I  I
deposits
Chile  1  1986  1  90%  of  n.a.  n.a.  0  2  callable  1  0
demand
deposits  up to
120  Ch$
China  0
Colombia  1  1985  1  75%  per  0  1  1  0  0.09%/O  of short-term  1  1
deposit  or Col$  liab., others  0.0015
10  Mil.
31Costa Rica  0
Denmark  1  1988  0  300,000 DKR  I  0  1  0  0.002 of total  3  1
deposits
Dominican  1  1962  0  RD $ 8,000  n.a.  n.a.  1  0  2  0
Rep.
Ecuador  0
Finland  1  1969  0  150,000  FIM  n.a.  0  1  1  0.0005 to 0.0030 of  3  1
insured deposits
France  1  1980  0  400,000 Fr  0  0  0  0  callable  3  0
Germany  1  1966  0  30% of banks'  1  0  1  0  0.0003 of deposits  3  0
equity capital
Ghana  0




Hong Kong  0
Hungary  1  1993  0  1,000,000  Ft  I  0  1  0  0.002 of total  1  1
deposits
India  1  1962  0  Rs 100,000  = 1  1  0  1  1  0.0005 of deposits  3  1
Lakh
Indonesia  0
Ireland  1  1989  1  90% of 20,000  1  1  1  0  0.002 of deposits  I  I
ECU




Japan  1  1971  0  Full coverage  I  I  I  1  0.00084 of insured  2  1
until March  deposits
2001
Jordan  0
Kenya  1  1985  0  K Sh 100,000  0  0  1  1  0.004 of deposits  I  I
Korea  1  1996  0  20,000,000  n.a.  n.a.  I  1  0.0002 of insured  2  n.a.
WON  deposits
Luxembourg  1  1989  0  15,000  ECU  I  0  0  0  callable  3  1
Malaysia  0
Mali  0
32Mexico  1  1986  0  No limit  I  n.a.  1  0  0.003 of covered  I  I
liab.
Nepal  0
Netherlands  1  1979  0  20,000 ECU  I  0  0  2  1
New Zealand  0
Nicaragua  0
Nigeria  1  1988  0  50,000 N  0  0  1  0  0.00937of deposits  I  I




Papua New  0
Guinea
Paraguay  0
Peru  1  1993  0  4,600 Si.  0  n.a.  I  1  0.0075 of total  2  0
deposits
Philippines  1  1963  0  P 100,000  1  0  1  1  0.002 of total  2  1
deposits
Poland  1  1995  1  Max. 90% of  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
3000 ECU
Russia  0
Saudi Arabia  0
Singapore  0
South Africa  0
Spain  1  1977  0  15,000  ECU  I  0  1  1  0.0002 of deposits  2  0
Sri Lanka  0
Sweden  1  1996  0  250,000 SEK  n.a.  0  1  0  0.0025 of deposits  n.a.  n.a.
Switzerland  1  1984  0  30,000 Sw F  n.a.  n.a.  0  1  callable  1  0
Taiwan  1  1985  0  1,000,000 NT  0  0  1  1  0.00015 of insured  1  0
deposits
Thailand  0
United  1  1982  1  75% of 20,000  0  0  1  1  .003 max  I  I Kingdom  GBP
United States  1  1934  0  100,000 US $  1  1  1  1  0.0024  1  0
Zimbabwe  0
33Table II. Bank Characteristics by Country
Interest Expense is the ratio of interest expense to interest paying debt. Deposit Growth is the percentage growth in real
deposits. Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets to
total assets. Profit is given by before tax profits divided by total assets.  Overhead is personnel expenses and other non-
interest expenses over total assets. Short Term Debt/Total Debt is customer and short term funding to total interest
paying debt. Data source is the BankScope data base of Fitch IBCA. Figures are 1990-1997 averages.
Interest  Deposit  Equity  Liquidity  Profit  Overhead  Short Term Debt/
Expense  Growth  Total Debt
Argentina  0.078  0.207  0.129  0.128  0.009  0.070  0.949
Australia  0.068  0.109  0.070  0.097  0.008  0.025  0.915
Austria  0.054  0.048  0.063  0.127  0.006  0.025  0.918
Bahrain  0.051  . 0.130  0.078  0.017  0.014  0.977
Belgium  0.057  0.082  0.057  0.203  0.004  0.022  0.984
Benin  0.021  0.081  0.064  0.001  0.021  0.037  0.981
Bolivia  0.090  0.131  0.085  0.138  0.006  0.046  0.984
Canada  . 0.084  0.082  0.196  0.000  0.020  0.978
Chile  . 0.051  0.114  0.310  0.004  0.031  0.918
China  . 0.189  0.100  0.309  0.013  0.014  0.840
Colombia  . 0.105  0.137  0.219  0.017  0.084  0.930
Costa Rica  . -0.038  0.153  0.268  0.025  0.051  0.952
Denmark  0.042  0.04-i  0.108  0.226  0.009  0.035  0.968
Dominican Rep.  . 0.176  0.101  0.308  0.019  0.063  0.619
Ecuador  0.278  0.145  0.302  0.031  0.073  0.931
Finland  0.058  0.075  0.053  0.165  -0.001  0.018  0.761
France  0.072  0.029  0.074  0.144  0.000  0.033  0.897
Germany  0.053  0.059  0.074  0.272  0.002  0.025  0.947
Ghana  . 0.301  0.105  0.487  0.044  0.069  0.980
Greece  0.096  0.225  0.067  0.327  0.009  0.035  0.997
Guatemala  . 0.093  0.084  0.230  0.007  0.058  0.816
Haiti  . 0.132  0.045  0.501  0.010  0.042  0.942
Honduras  . 0.172  0.129  0.262  0.020  0.043  0.899
Hong Kong  . 0.043  0.138  0.364  0.007  0.021  0.921
Hungary  . 0.141  0.097  0.090  0.018  0.043  0.943
India  . 0.260  0.118  0.242  0.013  0.024  0.933
Indonesia  . 0.240  0.103  0.219  0.010  0.028  0.892
Ireland  0.057  0.291  0.071  0.210  0.006  0.011  0.980
Italy  0.060  0.007  0.083  0.349  0.005  0.035  0.887
Japan  . 0.006  0.038  0.133  0.000  0.014  0.952
Jordan  0.052  0.040  0.064  0.326  0.007  0.025  0.985
Kenya  . 0.260  0.109  0.331  0.009  0.037  0.996
Korea  . 0.221  0.069  0.164  0.002  0.027  0.871
Luxembourg  0.072  0.0-46  0.046  0.430  0.004  0.011  0.945
Mali  . 0.087  0.048  0.001  0.010  0.069
Malta  0.042  0.187  0.060  0.207  0.010  0.014  0.993
Mexico  0.228  0.123  0.075  0.220  0.004  0.043  0.956
Morocco  . 0.119  0.084  0.335  0.007  0.027  0.996
Nepal  0.052  0.266  0.070  0.379  0.023  0.024  0.987
34Interest  Deposit  Equity  Liquidity  Profit  Overhead  Short Term Debt]
Expense  Growth  Total Debt
Netherlands  0.057  0.100  0.086  0.357  0.005  0.014  0.883
New Zealand  0.065  0.102  0.049  0.101  0.009  0.027  0.974
Nicaragua  0.056  . 0.061  0.262  0.010  0.053  0.888
Nigeria  0.075  0.085  0.096  0.571  0.020  0.085  0.998
Norway  0.064  0.074  0.064  0.058  0.009  0.023  0.903
Pakistan  0.070  0.164  0.067  0.433  0.005  0.030  1.000
Panama  0.062  0.117  0.082  0.195  0.012  0.020  0.948
Peru  0.077  0.311  0.101  0.239  0.012  0.077  0.988
Philippines  0.073  0.151  0.132  0.257  0.020  0.042  0.999
Poland  0.121  . 0.113  0.235  0.022  0.038  0.986
Russia  0.137  0.113  0.135  0.449  0.038  0.083  0.987
Senegal  0.020  0.087  0.064  0.000  0.022  0.048  0.981
Singapore  0.034  0.107  0.122  0.313  0.011  0.012  0.990
South Africa  0.116  0.150  0.084  0.164  0.011  0.039  0.925
Spain  0.070  0.104  0.088  0.179  0.006  0.030  0.990
Sri Lanka  0.084  0.113  0.104  0.207  0.017  0.035  0.877
Switzerland  0.045  0.055  0.108  0.177  0.007  0.035  0.831
Taiwan  0.054  0.204  0.082  0.148  0.007  0.015  0.999
Thailand  0.082  0.160  0.069  0.094  0.007  0.019  0.961
Tunisia  0.052  0.040  0.065  0.191  0.009  0.020  0.906
United Kingdom  0.060  -0.038  0.100  0.319  0.010  0.027  0.931
United States  0.035  0.071  0.082  0.126  0.011  0.036  0.826
35Table III.  Market Discipline - Interest Elasticities
The equation  estimated is Interest  Expenset= oL  + 013  Equity,-,  +  032  Profitt. 1 +  03 Liquidityt i+  N Overhead,  l+ P5  Short Term Debt/Total Debt,  l+ Et. Log transformations of  variables are
taken. The dependent  variable  is the ratio of interest expense  to interest paying debt. Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid
assets  to total assets. Profit is given by before  tax profits divided  by total assets. Overhead  is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets. Short termn  debt to total
debt is customer and short term funding to total interest paying debt. Data source is the BankScope  data base of Fitch IBCA. The sample period for each country is 1990-1997, where
available. Three different estimation  methods are used. The first one pools cross-bank  time-series data and uses Ordinary Least Squares.  The Between Estimator takes mean values for
each bank over the sample period.  The Within Estimator  uses pooled data but includes  bank and time fixed effects. Significance  tests are based on White's heteroskedasticity  consistent
errors. Bold numbers are significant  at levels equal to or less than 5 percent.
Pooled-OLS  Between Estimates  Within  Estimates
Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj.R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj. R-sq.  N
Argentina  0.053  0.169  -0.132  0.03  153  0.212  0.442  -0.254  0.27  51  -0.250  0.041  0.018  0.04  137
Australia  0.073  -0.019  -0.042  0.12  134  0.171  -0.289  0.006  0.05  39  0.172  -0.243  -0.025  0.28  128
Austria  -0.209  -0.112  -0.093  0.14  159  0.144  -0.230  -0.109  0.02  43  -0.050  0.019  -0.042  0.33  155
Bahrain  0.178  -2.282  0.020  0.44  25  . . . . . 0.013  0.037  0.018  0.75  25
Belgium  -0.082  -0.385  -0.869  0.33  185  -0.035  -0.721  -0.093  3.48  46  0.022  -0.027  -0.022  0.45  18!
Bolivia  -0.047  0.194  -0.243  0.17  41  -0.096  0.479  -0.551  0.42  13  -0.107  -0.082  -0.074  0.47  40
Denmark  0.048  -0.418  -0.183  0.42  243  0.154  -0.664  -0.172  0.48  55  -0.033  -0.063  -0.094  0.78  242
Finland  0.398  0.075  -0.014  0.00  35  0.665  -1.020  0.623  0.67  7  0.392  0.074  -0.091  0.75  34
France  0.035  -0.116  -0.105  0.10  840  0.062  -0.312  -0.137  0.14  217  -0.066  0.009  -0.007  0.21  827
Germnany  0.120  -0.086  -0.070  0.15  1082  0.192  -0.068  -0.072  0.20  260  -0.084  -0.083  -0.009  0.43  1082
Greece  -0.086  0.239  0.190  0.04  60  -0.206  0.118  0.036  0.20  15  0.034  0.229  -0.018  0.73  58
Ireland  -0.126  -0.930  0.098  0.21  27  -0.110  -0.942  0.170  0.26  13  0.102  -0.677  -0.027  0.11  25
Italy  -0.087  0.088  -0.243  0.38  69  -0.107  0.186  -0.130  0.40  52  -0.060  -0.154  -0.088  0.77  67
Luxembourg  -0.129  -0.138  -0.052  0.12  633  -0.110  0.334  -0.048  0.13  122  -0.142  -0.344  -0.033  0.30  630
Malta  -0.139  -0.358  0.030  0.30  19  . . . . . 0.005  -0.370  0.004  0.86  18
Mexico  -0.159  -0.319  -0.162  0.12  37  -0.089  -0.717  -0.005  0.30  19  -1.014  -0.425  -0.043  0.72  30
Nepal  0.042  -0.174  -0.404  0.63  12  . . . . . 0.234  -0.430  -0.686  0.82  10
Netherlands  -0.119  0.040  0.018  0.19  114  -0.083  0.017  0.021  0.21  32  0.049  -0.163  0.000  0.19  110
New Zealand  0.028  -0.105  -0.072  0.36  25  0.021  -0.922  -0.033  0.47  9  -0.011  0.418  0.097  0.69  23
Nicaragua  -0.401  -0.061  -0.259  0.32  33  -0.530  0.057  -0.214  0.12  13
Nigeria  0.264  -0.470  0.410  0.00  57  0.284  -0.611  0.431  0.01  25  -0.076  0.079  0.753  0.25  46
Norway  -0.157  -0.033  -0.058  0.10  73  -0.493  0.382  -0.014  0.39  15  -0.066  -0.036  0.062  0.61  73
Pakistan  0.026  0.176  0.011  0.07  87  0.011  0.507  0.013  0.08  20  -0.326  0.434  0.199  0.56  87
Panama  -0.121  0.001  -0.003  0.00  51  0.082  -0.566  0.075  0.00  24  -0.619  1.206  0.060  0.58  49
Peru  -0.492  -0.092  -0.327  0.20  78  -0.831  -0.522  -1.238  0.78  22  -0.168  0.082  0.130  0.17  77
Philippines  -0.483  0.372  -0.230  0.20  83  -0.580  0.261  -0.488  0.39  22  -0.210  0.285  -0.027  0.74  79
Poland  0.064  -0.147  -0.033  0.00  106  0.323  -0.262  -0.033  0.09  38
36Pooled-OLS  Between Estimates  Within  Estimates
Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj.R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity  Adj.  R-sq.  N
Russia  -0.268  0.170  -0.418  0.08  91  -0.161  0.205  -0.581  0.10  49  -0.001  -0.012  0.276  0.52  31
Singapore  -0.162  0.290  -0.147  0.00  58  -0.660  0.097  -0.467  0.00  12  0.005  0.128  0.144  0.69  58
SouthAfrica  0.158  -0.089  -0.014  0.25  49  0.171  -0.201  0.011  0.52  15  0.181  -0.064  -0.111  0.63  47
Spain  0.005  -0.011  0.046  0.03  353  0.076  -0.068  0.065  0.03  80  -0.269  0.137  0.023  0.69  342
Sri Lanka  -0.114  -0.352  -0.142  0.32  25  . . . . . 0.079  -0.096  -0.197  0.62  24
Switzerland  0.097  -0.289  -0.182  0.25  781  0.130  -0.260  -0.153  0.23  174  -0.198  -0.122  -0.067  0.53  766
Taiwan  -0.018  -0.061  -0.003  0.01  119  -0.044  0.006  -0.131  0.15  27  -0.026  -0.136  0.130  0.52  119
Thailand  0.232  -0.739  0.022  0.21  94  0.382  -0.995  -0.149  0.63  16  0.053  -0.229  -0.001  0.87  92
Tunisia  -0.255  -0.005  0.083  0.32  60  -0.034  -0.139  -0.243  0.21  10  -0.134  -0.234  -0.043  0.84  60
United Kingdom  0.011  -0.284  -0.478  0.20  169  -0.106  0.092  -0.021  0.14  53  0.147  -0.190  -0.010  0.15  162
United States  -0.171  0.017  -0.073  0.13  2373  -0.064  0.073  -0.079  0.16  526  -0.163  -0.087  -0.051  0.58  2346
37Table IV.  Market Discipline - Deposit Growth
The equation  estimated  is Deposit  Growtht = c + 
1 Equity,-,  +  032 Profit,.1 +  03 Liquidity.,+  04 Overhead,-,+ 
1 5 Size,,+  c,t. Log transformations  of variables  are taken.  The
dependent  variable is the real deposit growth.  Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities)  to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets to total assets. Profit is
given by before tax profits divided by total assets. Overhead  is personnel  expenses and other non-interest  expenses over total assets. Size is given by total assets. Bank data are
from the BankScope  data base of Fitch IBCA, and the GDP deflator used to construct Size,, is from the IMF's International  Financial Statistics.  The sample period for each
country is 1990-1997,  where available. Three different estimation methods are used.  The first one pools cross-bank  time-series data and uses Ordinary Least Squares. The
Between Estimator  takes mean values for each bank over the sample  period. The Within  Estimator  uses pooled data but includes  bank and time fixed effects. Significance  tests
are based on White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  errors. Bold numbers are significant  at levels  equal to or less than 5 percent.
Pooled-OLS  Between  Estimates  Within Estimates
Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N
Argentina  0.209  0.010  -0.045  0.15  148  -0.089  -0.061  -0.005  0.07  51  0.600  -0.004  -0.106  0.40  135
Australia  0.092  0.077  -0.026  0.06  137  -0.116  0.143  0.012  0.13  40  0.127  0.053  -0.051  0.07  131
Austria  0.086  0.065  -0.011  0.08  170  0.057  0.266  -0.015  0.18  45  0.201  -0.123  0.001  0.15  167
Belgium  -0.014  0.000  -0.003  0.04  160  -0.034  0.129  0.003  -0.01  46  0.236  0.153  0.002  0.19  154
Bolivia  0.179  0.028  0.121  0.12  43  0.306  -0.044  0.177  0.13  14  0.176  0.141  0.151  0.15  41
Canada  0.022  0.084  -0.012  0.06  242  -0.080  0.178  0.001  0.13  56  0.385  0.022  -0.059  0.33  234
Chile  -0.350  -0.120  -0.153  0.04  89  -0.230  0.131  -0.350  0.08  26  -0.033  -0.218  -0.037  0.05  86
China  0.123  0.093  -0.134  -0.02  37  0.269  -0.345  -0.220  -0.09  15  -0.516  1.205  0.252  0.06  30
Colombia  -0.131  0.088  0.023  0.03  94  -0.214  0.001  0.000  0.13  23  -0.051  0.078  0.046  0.36  90
Costa Rica  -0.016  -2.399  -0.134  -0.09  30  -0.194  -7.542  -1.063  0.00  15  -0.251  0.411  0.137  0.34  23
Denmark  0.077  -0.035  0.061  0.10  249  0.101  -0.007  0.167  0.45  56  0.275  0.023  0.009  0.50  248
Dominican  Rep.  0.131  0.100  -0.317  -0.01  47  0.060  0.039  -0.557  0.58  15  0.261  0.436  0.226  0.14  45
Ecuador  1.228  -0.645  -0.170  0.26  24  0.465  -0.836  -0.341  0.12  14  1.010  -1.123  0.048  0.82  16
Finland  0.148  -0.148  -0.016  -0.15  35  -0.749  0.270  -0.270  0.78  7  0.680  -0.037  -0.019  0.30  34
France  -0.053  0.086  0.026  0.02  1177  -0.089  0.059  0.036  0.02  272  0.119  0.025  0.004  0.04  1150
Germany  -0.0027  0.0878  -0.006  0.02  1125  -.0500  0.088  0.005  0.01  265  0.244  0.095  -0.038  0.15  1125
Ghana  0.987  -0.165  -0.036  -0.05  12  2.084  -0.305  0.066  -0.25  7  -0.476  0.221  -0.116  1.00  9
Greece  0.181  -0.496  0.002  0.05  24  0.263  -0.627  0.244  -0.22  12  0.688  -0.712  -0.212  0.42  24
Guatemala  0.287  -0.467  -0.134  0.33  105  0.335  -0.533  -0.067  0.40  33  0.656  -0.368  -0.141  0.57  99
Haiti  -0.403  -0.042  -1.485  0.35  10  -0.733  -0.196  -2.067  . 5  -2.404  -32.452  -8.690  1.00  8
Hong Kong  0.019  -0.124  0.056  0.03  75  -0.100  -0.134  -0.051  -0.14  24  0.261  -0.065  0.202  0.22  71
Honduras  -0.241  -0.198  0.279  0.25  23  -0.370  -0.121  0.371  0.06  9  0.643  -0.028  0.032  0.07  21
Hungary  0.138  0.028  -0.033  0.13  44  0.057  0.247  -0.022  -0.02  25  0.133  -0.114  -0.037  0.29  41
38Pooled-OLS  Between  Estimates  Within Estimates
Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N  Equity  Profit  Liquidity Adj. R-sq.  N
Indonesia  0.160  -0.097  -0.028  0.06  347  0.174  -0.387  -0.027  0.07  95  0.168  0.037  -0.039  0.07  339
Ireland  0.126  0.028  -0.047  0.48  50  0.314  -1.505  -0.096  0.60  17  -0.146  0.746  -0.012  0.45  48
Italy  -0.015  0.217  0.031  0.03  73  -0.074  0.427  -0.004  0.24  53  0.213  0.224  0.065  0.32  71
Japan  0.095  -0.041  0.019  0.18  775  0.147  -0.173  0.043  0.42  148  0.198  -0.131  -0.069  0.24  773
Jordan  -0.082  -0.674  0.044  0.30  39  -0.723  3.708  -0.020  . 6  0.309  -0.110  -0.049  0.19  39
Kenya  0.172  -0.959  -0.219  0.17  10  -0.006  -1.792  0.363  0.67  9  -1.272  2.889  1.552  . 6
Korea  0.169  0.135  0.136  0.24  125  0.166  0.337  0.147  0.36  29  0.166  -0.131  0.028  0.01  125
Luxembourg  0.063  0.127  -0.028  -0.02  125  -0.098  -0.078  -0.030  0.04  68  0.174  0.210  -0.036  0.02  125
Malta  0.399  -0.664  -0.019  -0.08  18  0.239  -2.113  -0.042  . 6  -0.231  0.482  0.042  0.04  17
Mexico  0.223  0.322  0.036  0.63  25  0.338  0.527  0.376  0.58  12  0.998  0.456  -0.049  0.76  19
Morocco  -0.034  0.128  -0.034  0.22  27  -0.475  0.165  0.545  0.44  7  0.075  -0.528  -0.600  0.31  26
Nepal  -0.390  -0.016  -0.126  0.70  15  -1.116  0.583  -0.184  . 6  -0.330  -0.633  -0.597  0.81  13
Netherlands  0.300  0.055  -0.038  0.01  176  0.199  0.359  -0.046  -0.10  44  -0.101  -0.395  -0.116  0.03  170
New Zealand  -0.017  -0.138  -0.004  -0.15  24  -0.006  -0.763  0.012  -0.09  9  0.425  0.496  0.036  0.73  22
Nigeria  0.036  0.558  -0.555  0.09  41  -0.100  0.876  -0.857  0.36  20  0.421  0.239  -0.254  0.56  37
Norway  0.135  -0.026  0.030  0.21  72  0.221  -0.190  0.044  0.66  15  -0.058  0.050  0.058  0.31  72
Pakistan  0.111  0.015  -0.030  0.29  87  0.092  0.005  -0.076  0.37  21  0.304  -0.225  -0.143  0.41  86
Panama  0.098  0.160  0.022  -0.03  40  -0.066  0.196  0.038  -0.36  16  0.312  -0.376  -0.072  0.11  36
Peru  0.164  0.171  -0.330  0.21  94  0.192  0.180  -0.209  0.08  22  0.416  0.117  -0.480  0.44  93
Philippines  0.189  -0.050  -0.091  0.19  110  0.250  0.003  -0.045  0.52  27  0.166  -0.400  -0.251  0.45  103
Singapore  0.534  -0.724  -0.200  0.34  57  0.397  -0.690  -0.303  -0.03  12  0.880  -0.467  0.113  0.51  57
South Africa  -0.118  0.082  0.015  0.00  75  -0.198  0.308  0.017  -0.12  24  -0.122  0.179  0.056  0.00  71
Spain  -0.038  0.122  -0.016  0.00  349  -0.093  0.101  -0.023  -0.04  80  0.224  0.020  0.017  0.12  337
Sri Lanka  0.144  -0.115  0.059  0.12  24  -0.297  1.686  1.194  . 6  -0.090  0.720  0.146  0.26  23
Switzerland  -0.031  0.046  0.014  0.00  712  -0.094  -0.077  0.033  0.05  178  0.305  0.090  0.003  0.11  691
Thailand  0.100  -0.173  -0.087  0.07  96  0.156  -0.201  -0.184  0.61  16  0.042  -0.026  -0.130  0.23  94
Tunisia  0.057  -0.048  -0.073  0.13  59  0.069  -0.179  -0.062  0.16  10  0.034  0.004  -0.074  0.38  59
United Kingdom  0.478  -0.165  -0.097  0.09  275  0.308  0.166  -0.065  0.02  80  0.407  0.066  0.036  0.20  266
United States  -0.015  0.009  -0.007  0.00  2346  -0,044  0.045  -0.009  0.00  525  0.069  0.007  0.002  0.02  2326
39Table V. Deposit  Interest  Rates and Deposit Insurance
The estimated  model  is Interest  Expense[Bnk,=  i, Counbyj, Time=  tr  a  + (3  Equityij, 1 1 +  P2  Liquidityj 1 ,,  +  D33  Profitij,ll +  04
OverheadijJ,,  +  Pi
3 Short  Term  Debt/Total  Debtij,>  +  136  Inflation j,t  +  037  Growthj,t  +  Ps  Government  Ratej,t +
I3gGnp/capj,,  + PloDeposit Insurance  j,t + 
6 ij,t. Log transformations  of variables are taken. The dependent  variable is the
ratio of interest expense  to interest paying debt. Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) to total assets.
Liquidity is defined as liquid assets to total assets. Profit is given by before tax profits divided by t6tal assets. Overhead
is personnel expenses and other non-interest  expenses over total assets. Short Term Debt/Total Debt is customer and
short term funding  to total interest paying debt.  Inflation  is the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. Growth is
the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Gnp/cap is the real GNP per capita. Deposit Insurance is a dummy
variable that takes on a value one if an explicit deposit insurance scheme exists. Bank data are from the BankScope
data base of Fitch IBCA, and macro data are from the IMF's International  Financial Statistics. The sample period is
1990-1997.  For each specification,  column a uses averaged bank data for the sample period, and column b uses time-
series cross-section  pooled data. Estimation technique  is weighted least squares, with the weight being the inverse of
the number of banks for the country in column a and inverse of the number of banks in a given year in column b.
Specification 3 also includes interaction  terms of the first three variables with the deposit insurance dummy.  White's
heteroscedasiticy  consistent  standard errors are given in parentheses.
(L.a)  (L.b)  (2.a)  (2.b)  (3.a)  (3.b)
Equity  -.014  -.047***  -.020  -.048**  .013  .047
(.027)  (.020)  (.028)  (.022)  (.053)  (.042)
Profit  -.142**  -.066  -.148**  -.068  -.107  -.183
(.072)  (.040)  (.073)  (.041)  (.111)  (.106)
Liquidity  -.079***  -.039***  -.080***  -.042***  -.187***  -.158***
(.013)  (.007)  (.013)  (.007)  (.033)  (.021)
Overhead  -.112***  -.105***  -.118***  -.115***  -.124***  -.117***
(.024)  (.015)  (.024)  (.015)  (.025)  (.015)
Short term debt/total  debt  .051***  .066*  * *  .052***  .071***  .053***  .079***
(.020)  (.022)  (.019)  (.021)  (.017)  (.018)
Inflation  .919  .256  1.004*  .316  .971  .269
(.528)  (.346)  (.551)  (.353)  (.552)  (.348)
Growth  -1.115  -1.371***  -.549  -1.533***  -1.121  -1.881***
(.956)  (.436)  (.972)  (.455)  (.967)  (.437)
Govemmnent  rate  .493***  .618***  .470***  .587***  .472***  .588***
(.066)  (.038)  (.062)  (.039)  (,061)  (.040)
Gnp/cap  -.028  .024*  -.023  .021  -.035  .011
(.021)  (.013)  (.020)  (.014)  (.020)  (.014)
Deposit insurance  -.093***  -.065***  -.083  .286
(.038)  (.029)  (.432)  (.314)
Equity x  -.038  -.124**
Deposit insurance  (.065)  (.051)
Profit x  -.045  .138
Deposit insurance  (.147)  (.114)
Liquidity x  .128***  .134***
Deposit insurance  (.035)  (.022)
No. of obs.  1581  5183  1565  5113  1565  5113
No. of countries  30  30  28  28  28  28
Adj. R-square  .46  .45  .47  .44  .48  .46
Fvalue  152***  469***  139***  400***  112***  332***
***,**,  and * indicate  statistical  significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
40Table VI
Deposit  Growth  and Deposit  Insurance
The estimated model is Deposit Growth[Baank  i, Countryj, Time= t]  a + ,1 Equityij,,l  +  P2  Liquidityij,,l + J 3 Profitij; .l  +  034
Overheadij,tl +  35  Inflation  j,t +  06 Growthj,  + 037  Government  Ratej,t  + OsGnp/capj,t + JgDeposit Insurance  j, +  ij,t -
Log transformations  of  variables are taken. The dependent  variable is the percentage  growth in real deposits.  Equity is
book value of equity (assets minus liabilities)  to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets to total assets. Profit is
given by before  tax profits divided by total assets.  Overhead is personnel  expenses and other non-interest  expenses over
total assets. Inflation is the annual inflation rate of the GDP deflator. Growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita. Gnp/cap is the real Gnp per capita. Deposit Insurance  is a dummy variable  that takes on a value of on if there
exists an explicit deposit insurance scheme.  Bank data are from the BankScope data base of Fitch IBCA, and macro
data are from the IMF's Intemational Financial Statistics.  The sample period is 1990-1997. For each specification,
column a uses  averaged bank data for the sample period. Column b uses time-series cross-section pooled data.
Estimation technique is weighted least squares, with the weight being the inverse of the number of banks for the
country in column a and inverse of the number of banks in a given year in column b. White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent  standard errors are given in parentheses.
(La)  (L.b)  (2.a)  (2.b)
Equity  .049***  .058***  .049**  .056***
(.021)  (.013)  (.022)  (.013)
Profit  -.123  .007  -.128  .007
(.076)  (.026)  (.077)  (.026)
Liquidity  .008  -.002  .006  -.003
(.006)  (.004)  (.007)  (.004)
Overhead  .037**  .024  .041  **  .026
(.016)  (.015)  (.016)  (.015)
Inflation  .043  -.421**  -.040  -.486**
(.406)  (.174)  (.412)  (.176)
Growth  L.745***  1.051***  1.713**  -1.060***
(.652)  (.337)  (.692)  (.351)
Govemment rate  -.023  -.014  -.016  -.009
(.037)  (.022)  (.035)  (.022)
Gnp/cap  -.026***  -.023***  -.028***  -.027***
(.009)  (.006)  (.010)  (.008)
Deposit insurance  -.005  .009
(.030)  (.020)
No. of obs.  2205  7321  2182  7238
No. of countries  50  50  46  46
Adj. R-square  .04  .04  .04  .04
F value  12***  36***  I1***  33**
***,*,  ~and * indicate statistical  significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent,  respectively.
41Table VII. Deposit  Interest  Rates and Deposit  Insurance  Design Features
The estimated  model is Interest Expense[aBnk  i, Country=j, Timem  tCL  +  t  1 Equityij,t-I  +  02  Liquidityij, 41 l  +  ,3N  Profiti 1 j, 11  +  04  OverheadijJ,l+  ,B5 Short Term Debt/Total Debtij,t-l  +  36
Inflation  jt+  37  Growthj,,  +  18  Government  rate,t + D3Gnp/capj 1 + ,I3oDeposit  Insurance  j,t + 0
1Ilnsurance design feature j,t + Eij,t. Log transformations of variables are taken. The
dependent  variable  is the ratio of interest expense  to interest paying debt. Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities) to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets
to total assets.  Profit is given by before  tax profits divided  by total assets. Overhead  is personnel expenses  and other non-interest  expenses over total assets. Short Term Debt/Total
Debt is customer  and short term funding  to total interest  paying debt. Inflation is the annual inflation  rate from the GDP deflator. Growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita.  Gnp/cap  is the real GNP per capita. Deposit Insurance  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an explicit deposit insurance scheme exists. In each specification a
deposit  design feature is included. Only the estimated  coefficients  for deposit insurance  variables are reported  below. Bank data are from the BankScope data base of Fitch IBCA,
and macro  data are from the IMF's International  Financial Statistics.  The sample period is 1990-1997. For each specification,  Panel A uses time-series cross-section  pooled data
and Panel  B uses averaged bank data for the sample  period. Estimation  technique is weighted least squares, with the weight being the inverse of the number of banks in a given year
in Panel and the inverse  of the number of banks  for the country in Panel B. White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard errors  are given in parentheses.
Is there  Explicit  Are  Are  Type of Fund:  Source  of  Insurance  Fund  Individual  Membership:
Co-  Coverage  Foreign  Interbank  Unfunded  or  Funding:  Premium  Management  Dummy  Voluntary  (0),
insurance?  Limit  Currency  Deposits  Implicit (0),  Implicit  (0),  as % of  Dummy:  Variables for  Compulsory  (1)
Deposits  Covered?  Unfunded  but  Banks only (1),  Deposits  Implicit (0),  Joint, and
Covered?  Callable  (1),  Goveniment  Public (1),  Private
Funded (2)  and Banks (2),  Joint (2),  Management
Government  Private (3)
only (3)
Panel A. Pooled-OLS
Deposit  .078***  -.208***  ..071**  -.188***  -.133***  .057  -.163***  .124***  .038  -.061**
Insurance  (.030)  (.038)  (.035)  (.033)  (.036)  (.059)  (.029)  (.056)  (.050)  (.030)
Design  .077  .010*  .057**  .001  .042**  -.072***  .005  -.096***  (J) -.114**  .007
Elements  (.049)  (.006)  (.029)  (.023)  (.017)  (.025)  (.008)  (.019)  (.041)  (.022)
(P)-.193***
(.038)
N, country  4994,27  4196,21  3954,24  3705,22  5113,28  5072,27  3166,20  5072, 27  5072,27  5072,27
Adj. R-sq.  .43  .42  .45  .39  .44  .45  .41  .46  .46  .44
F value  349***  277***  295***  214***  366***  372***  202***  388***  356***  367***
Panel  B. Between  Estimates
Deposit  -.099***  -.110***  -.074  -.167***  1.129***  .022  1.l24***  .050  -.023  -.072
Insurance  (.038)  (.049)  (.053)  (.044)  (.055)  (.071)  (.046)  (.079)  (.071)  (.047)
Design  .051  .005  .006  -.015  .024  -.057*  -.009  -.062***  (J)-.041  .002
Elements  (.074)  (.006)  (.044)  (.037)  (.027)  (.031)  (.108)  (.026)  (.056)  (.032)
(P)-.  124**
(.052)
N, country  1538,27  1316,22  1256,24  1190,22  1565,28  1552,27  974,20  1552, 27  1552,  27  1552,  27
Adj. R-sq.  .47  .47  .47  .44  .47  .47  .45  .48  .48  .47
F value  124***  105***  101***  85***  127***  128***  75***  130***  119***  127***
***,**,  and * indicate statistical  significance  at 1, 5, and 10  percent,  respectively.
42Table VIII
Market Discipline  and Deposit  Insurance  Design Features
The estimated  model is Interest  Expense[B.,,-  i,  Countny=,  Time=  t  ct + %1  Equityij,t 1. +  032 Liquidityjj,t_i + j3 Profitij,,l  +  34  Overheadij,t-.  +
,Bs Short Term DebtlTotal  Debtjj,d  X+  ,B6 Inflation  j,+  ,B7 Growthj,t  +  PS  Government  Ratej,,+  JGnp/capj,,  + 13g 0Deposit  Insurance  jt +
pil Insurance design featurej, +  0312  Insurance design feature j,t xEquityjj,t_  +  3l3 1lnsurance  design featurej, xLiquidityij,,  +  14
Insurance  design feature  j,t xProfiti-j,, 1 + Ejj,,.  Log transformations  of variables  are taken. The dependent variable  is the ratio of interest
expense to interest paying debt. Equity is book value of equity (assets minus liabilities)  to total assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid
assets  to total assets. Profit is given by before  tax profits divided by total assets. Overhead  is personnel  expenses and other non-interest
expenses over total assets.  Short Term Debt/Total  Debt is customer  and short term funding to total interest paying debt. Inflation is
the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. Growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita.  Gnp/cap is the real GNP
per capita. Deposit Insurance is a dummy variable that takes a value one if an explicit deposit insurance scheme exists. Insurance
design features correspond to those in Table 7. Three additional variables are interactions of the first three  variables with the
insurance design feature. Bank data are from the BankScope data base of Fitch IBCA, and macro data are from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics.  The sample period is 1990-1997. For each specification,  panel A uses time-series cross-section
pooled data. Panel B uses averaged bank data for the sample period. Estimation  technique is weighted least squares, with the weight
being the inverse  of the number of banks in a given year in panel A and the inverse of the number of banks for the countiy in panel B.
Below only the risk factors, deposit insurance variables,  and their interaction  terms are reported. White's heteroscedasiticy  consistent
standard  errors are given in parentheses.
Panel A: OLS Estimates
Explicit  Are  Type of Fund:  Source  of Funding:  Fund  Individual
Coverage  Foreign  Unfunded  or  Implicit (0),  Management  Dummy
Limit  Currency  Implicit  (0),  Banks only (1),  Dummy:  Implicit  Variables  for
Deposits  Unfunded  but  Government and  (0), Public (1),  Joint, and
Covered?  Callable (1),  Banks (2),  Joint (2), Private  Private
Funded  (2)  Gov.  only (3)  (3)  Management
Equity  .022  .024  .034  -.001  .032  .006
(.029)  (.028)  (.033)  (.036)  (.037)  (.033)
Profit  -.194**  -.123**  -.180**  -.170**  -.181**  176***
(.067)  (.064)  (.086)  (.088)  (.086)  (.076)
Liquidity  -.069***  -.076***  -.099***  -.082***  -.092***  -.057***
(.011)  (.010)  (.013)  (.015)  (.017)  (.016)
Deposit  -.225***  -.089**  -.174***  .018  .098  .037
insurance  (.039)  (.035)  (.035)  (.060)  (.056)  (.050)
Design  feature  .173**  .026  .216  .179  -.021  (J) .174
(.079)  (.249)  (.156)  (.154)  (.115)  (.267)
(P)-.155
(.333)
Equity  x  -.005  -.224***  *.069**  -.039  -.050**  (J) -.087**
Design feature  (.015)  (.057)  (.026)  (.024)  (.016)  (.043)
(P)-.122***
(.043)
Profit x  .050**  .128  .080  .082  .046  (J).159
Design feature  (.022)  (.081)  (.051)  (.053)  (.037)  (.089)
(P) .094
(.098)
Liquidity  x  .011**  .069***  .047***  .037***  .024***  (J)  .003
Design feature  (.005)  (.023)  (.011)  (.011)  (.007)  (.019)
(P)  .026
(.020)
No. of obs.  4196  3954  5113  5072  5071  5072
No. of countries  21  24  28  27  27  27
Adj.  R-square  .43  .47  .45  .45  .46  .46
F value  226***  247***  302***  299***  313***  240***
***,** and * indicate statistical  significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent,  respectively.
43Panel B: Between  Estimates
Explicit  Are  Type of Fund:  Source of Funding:  Fund  Individual
Coverage  Foreign  Unfunded  or  Implicit (0),  Management  Dummy
Limit  Currency  Implicit (0),  Banks only (1),  Dummy: Implicit  Variables for
Deposits  Unfunded  but  Government  and  (0), Public (1),  Joint, and
Covered?  Callable  (1),  Banks (2),  Joint (2), Private  Private
Funded  (2)  Government  (3)  Management
only (3)
Equity  -.022  .008  -.014  -.033  .022  .007
(.039)  (.035)  (.046)  (.049)  (.049)  (.044)
Profit  -.143*  -.176  -.140  -.143  -.159  -.196**
(.078)  (.091)  (.098)  (.105)  (.104)  (.096)
Liquidity  -.088***  -.123  -.127***  -.133***  -.154***  -.105***
(.017)  (.020)  (.023)  (.025)  (.029)  (.027)
Deposit  -.117**  -.086  -.137***  .009  .056  -.025
insurance  (.054)  (.054)  (.056)  (.074)  (.082)  (.073)
Design feature  .046  .489  .089  .095  -.091  (J) .449
(.062)  (.548)  (.249)  (.258)  (.200)  (.582)
(P)-.422
(.655)
Equity  x  -.003  -.120  -.003  .016  -.032  (J) -.066
Design feature  (.013)  (.071)  (.036)  (.035)  (.025)  (.066)
(P)-.078
(.067)
Profitx  .019  .190  -.001  .007  -.011  (J).188
Design feature  (.021)  (.175)  (.079)  (.086)  (.065)  (.189)
(P) -.070
(.208)
Liquidityx  .002  .080**  .036**  .041**  .042***  (J) .024
Design feature  (.004)  (.035)  (.016)  (.017)  (.013)  (.029)
(P) .071**
(.035)
No. of obs.  1316  1256  1565  1552  1552  1552
No. of countries  22  24  28  27  27  27
Adj.  R-square  .47  .48  .47  .48  .49  .48
F value  83***  83***  101***  103***  106***  81***
***,**,  and * indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and 10  percent, respectively.
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